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CORRUPT AND UNEQUAL, BOTH 
Lawrence Lessig* 
 
Rick Hasen has presented the issue of money in politics as if we have to 
make a choice1:  it is either a problem of equality or it is a problem of 
corruption.  Hasen’s long and influential career in this field has been a long 
and patient struggle to convince those on the corruption side of the fight 
(we liberals, at least, and, in an important sense, we egalitarians too) to 
resist the temptation to try to pass—by rendering equality arguments as 
corruption arguments, and to just come out of the closet.  Hasen had 
famously declared that the corruption argument supporting Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce2 was a fake3 and that the only basis for 
justifying the ban on corporate spending in Austin was equality, not 
corruption.4  And the U.S. Supreme Court famously (in our circles at least) 
agreed,5 in the process of striking down the ban on corporate spending in 
Austin and everywhere else.6  Thus, Hasen argues, it is a fool’s errand to 
fake the corruption argument.  We need instead, Hasen has constantly 
counseled, a bit of egalitarian pride.  Be true to ourselves, Hasen tells us, 
and give up the pretense of corruption talk. 
But as much as I admire Hasen’s persistence and increasing passion—
and I have a privileged perspective in this because I have had the pleasure 
of reading his forthcoming Plutocrats United,7 a book that will certainly 
mark him as the dean of this field—I think that he has presented us with a 
false dichotomy.  It is not either corruption or equality.  It is both.  Our 
current system for funding campaigns is corrupt, but it is corrupt precisely 
 
*  Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School.  This Article is 
part of a symposium entitled Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham 
University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, Foreword:  Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
407 (2015). 
 
 1. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a 
Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws?  A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 305 (2013). 
 2. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 3. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 112–14 (2003). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 381 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 6. See id. at 365 (majority opinion). 
 7. RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED (forthcoming 2016). 
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because it violates a certain kind of equality.  The violation is not an 
equality of speech, but an equality of citizenship. 
Let me begin in familiar territory:  Is it corrupt? 
To get the sense in which the argument that I have made—and that 
Zephyr Teachout’s brilliant book, Corruption in America,8 does the real 
work to defend—is an argument about “corruption,” we need to start with a 
key, analytical point. 
There is a difference between predicating corruption of an individual and 
predicating corruption of an entity—not a difference in degree, but a 
difference in kind.  To say that an entity is corrupt is not to say that it is 
filled with corrupt individuals—it may or may not be.  It is perfectly 
conceivable—conceptually—to imagine a corrupt institution filled with 
noncorrupt individuals.  And it is perfectly conceivable—conceptually—to 
imagine a noncorrupt institution filled with many corrupt individuals. 
The reason for this is that the word “corruption” is describing different 
things when predicated of an institution, rather than of an individual—not 
necessarily, but conceivably.  An institution is a system.  To say that a 
system has been corrupted is to say that it is not functioning as designed; 
something has interfered with its ability to function as designed.  That 
interference is the corruption. 
Take a very practical example:  the heat in an apartment building.  
Imagine each apartment has a thermostat.  The thermostat reads the 
temperature in the apartment and then directs heat to the apartment based on 
that temperature.  We could say, in this sense, the system was designed to 
create a certain dependence.  The amount of heat delivered to an apartment 
is to depend on the reading of the thermostat, and it is to depend exclusively 
on the reading of the thermostat in that apartment.  Or in Madison-speak, 
we could say, the heat is to “depend on the reading of the thermostat in each 
apartment alone.”9 
But imagine the wires get crossed, so that the calls for heat from 
apartment 104 are being influenced by the need for heat in apartment 105.  
The old woman in 104 likes a moderate temperature.  The crazy Alaskan in 
105 likes it cold.  So the Alaskan opens his window, the temperature in his 
apartment falls, the system records a falling temperature in what it 
understands to be 104 and 105, and thus, the system pumps up heat to 104 
(because the Alaskan—being an Alaskan—is environmentally aware 
enough to turn his thermostat down). 
It is a perfectly correct usage of the word “corruption” to say that this 
heating of apartment 104 has been “corrupted.”  The heat depends not upon 
the readings from the thermostat in 104 alone; the heat depends as well 
upon the reading from the thermostat in 105.  The dependence is thus not 
 
 8. See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA:  FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). 
 9. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that to have left open the right of suffrage to the regulation of the states “would 
have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government 
which ought to be dependent on the people alone”). 
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exclusive, as it should be by design, but has instead become jointly 
dependent on the reading from both thermostats.  And that joint dependence 
will produce conflicting results.  Our old lady will not get the amount of 
heat she wants because the system for heating in her apartment has been 
“corrupted.” 
Teachout and I have argued that the Framers spoke in precisely this way.  
They certainly spoke of “corruption” as predicated of individuals—such 
that for them, the statement “Randolph is corrupt” means Randolph took 
money to bend American policy in ways the funder desired. 
But they spoke as well of “corruption” predicated of an institution.  Thus, 
the statement “The British Parliament is corrupt” is not necessarily a 
statement about the willingness of members of the British Parliament to 
take bribes.  It is instead more often meant as a statement about the 
improper dependence of the British Parliament.  Through a series of 
corruptions, the King had an influence within the House of Commons that 
the theory of the House of Commons rejected:  the Commons was to be 
dependent on the People.  But the presence of the influence of the King, 
through his placement, corrupted that exclusive dependence.10 
My claim is that the Framers spoke in both ways, and I have tried to 
calculate just how frequently.  In a study of the usage of the word 
“corruption” by the Framers,11 of 325 uses of the word that were found, just 
six were used to mean quid pro quo.12  This use of “corruption” accounted 
for only 1.8 percent of the overall usage and always spoke of an 
individual’s corruption.13  But in the balance of the cases, talk of individual 
corruption was relatively rare—just 43 percent.14  Much more common was 
talk of the corruption of institutions.  Fifty-seven percent of the instances of 
the word being used were cases in which corruption was being predicated of 
an institution.15  And by far, the most common of those was what I have 
called dependence corruption—that an institution is corrupt because it has 
the wrong dependence within it.16 
That is the state of our Congress today.  It is corrupt not in an individual 
sense (I agree with Hasen and Dennis Thompson17 that ours is the least 
corrupt Congress in the history of Congress in this individual sense of 
corruption).  But it is corrupt in an institutional sense.  The Framers meant 
for the House, at least (and I will gloss the Senate for now, and let me 
 
 10. See TEACHOUT, supra note 8, at 35 (explaining that “[t]he king used wealth and 
patronage to gain influence over British parliamentarians, undermining constitutional 
government”). 
 11. See Brief for Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 
9–10, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536). 
 12. Id. at 9. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 7–8. 
 17. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS:  FROM INDIVIDUAL TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 3 (1995); Richard L. Hasen, Why Isn’t Congress More 
Corrupt?:  A Preliminary Inquiry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (2015). 
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therefore refer to Congress generally), to have a certain kind of 
dependence—a “dependence,” as Madison put it, “on the people alone.”18  
Instead, Congress today has a dependence on the people and also a 
dependence on a tiny number of campaign funders.  That additional 
dependence—like the dependence of Parliament on the King—is a 
corrupting dependence, because it undermines the exclusivity that the 
system was intended to have. 
All that is familiar to anyone following this debate.19  But here is the 
additional part that loops back to the claim I made at the start:  this is a 
corrupt system precisely because it denies a certain kind of equality. 
Think about Texas in 1924.  In the year before, the Texas Legislature had 
restricted the Democratic primary to whites only.20  While all (in theory, at 
least) could vote in the general election, only whites could vote in the 
Democratic primary.  Texas justified its restriction on the basis of an 
otherwise perfectly valid First Amendment interest—the right of citizens to 
associate as they wish.  Yet we all now intuitively understand why, in 1924, 
that system of association denied blacks equal standing in the Republic.  
Whites had a procedural advantage over blacks in that system, and that 
procedural advantage denied blacks equality. 
This is so, even though (again, just in principle) whites and blacks both 
could vote in the general election.  This point highlights a confusion in the 
Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. FEC21 opinion.  While arguing that any 
“appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose 
faith in our democracy,” the Court invoked what seems, in the context, to 
be a correct principle of logic.22  As the Court wrote, 
The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend 
money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the 
ultimate influence over elected officials.  This is inconsistent with any 
suggestion that the electorate will refuse “to take part in democratic 
governance” because of additional political speech made by a corporation 
or any other speaker.23 
The suggestion of this argument is that because a group has “ultimate 
influence,” that group has no reason to doubt its influence within an 
electoral system.  The White Primary demonstrates the logical flaw in that 
argument.  Even if blacks had the right to participate equally in the general 
 
 18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 9, at 326 (James Madison). 
 19. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 305 (“I recently discussed my concerns about the 
dependence corruption argument in a Harvard Law Review book review of Lessig’s new 
book, Republic, Lost, and Lessig has responded with a defense in a Harvard Law Review 
Forum Reply and in his public presentations.”). 
 20. See 1925 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 3107 (repealed 1985) (“In no event shall a negro be 
eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas, and 
should a negro vote in a Democratic primary election, such ballot shall be void and election 
officials shall not count the same.”). 
 21. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 22. Id. at 360. 
 23. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000))). 
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election—which of course they did not,24 but assume for the purposes of 
this argument that they did—that they were excluded from the nominating 
process means that their influence within the system was radically 
diminished.  As Boss Tweed famously quipped, “I don’t care who does the 
electing, as long as I get to do the nominating.”25  Tweed understood that 
“ultimate influence” was quite meaningless if a faction had controlling 
influence at an earlier stage of the electoral process. 
The system we have for funding campaigns today is functionally 
equivalent to the White Primary.  Call it the Green Primary.26  The Green 
Primary is the contest to raise the money that candidates need to compete in 
an election.  Winning that primary—or at least doing very well—is a 
condition to being a “credible” candidate in either the voting primary or 
general election.  In 2012, Buddy Roemer was easily the most qualified 
candidate in the Republican primary for President:  he was a three-term 
Congressman, he had been Governor of Louisiana, and he had built a 
successful community bank.  Yet because he refused to take contributions 
greater than $100, his campaign was not viewed as “viable,” and he was not 
permitted to join even a single national debate.  His lack of campaign 
funding meant he was not a “credible” candidate.27 
Likewise in the 2014 New York Democratic primary for Governor, 
Zephyr Teachout was a politically attractive and strong candidate, 
advancing a critically important anticorruption platform in a context in 
which corruption reform had become a central issue in the gubernatorial 
campaign.28  Yet the Governor refused to debate Teachout,29 and that 
refusal was generally accepted by the press because her campaign was not 
viewed as “credible.”  But here again, credibility was a function of the 
money.  Teachout eventually raised close to $600,000.30  Cuomo had raised 
over $30,000,000.31  So despite her eventually winning close to 35 percent 
 
 24. See generally 1 HANES WALTON, JR. ET AL., THE AFRICAN AMERICAN ELECTORATE:  
A STATISTICAL HISTORY (2012). 
 25. SUSAN WELCH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 223 (13th ed. 
2011). 
 26. Cf. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 273–74 (1993). 
 27. See Lawrence Lessig, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform:  
Americans Elect, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2012/04/the-last-best-chance-for-campaign-finance-reform-americans-elect/256361/ 
[http://perma.cc/R6FY-LANF]. 
 28. See Susanne Craig et al., Cuomo’s Office Hobbled Ethics Inquiries by Moreland 
Commission, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/ 
governor-andrew-cuomo-and-the-short-life-of-the-moreland-commission.html [http://perma. 
cc/34S3-MMZK]. 
 29. See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Is Running but Isn’t One to Talk About It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/nyregion/cuomo-is-running-but-isnt-
one-to-talk-about-it.html [http://perma.cc/3876-DJ3D]. 
 30. Philip Bump, Andrew Cuomo Spent Almost 40 Times As Much for His Votes As 
Zephyr Teachout, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/09/10/andrew-cuomo-spent-almost-40-times-as-much-for-his-votes-as-zephyr-
teachout/ [http://perma.cc/TV7A-FS4S]. 
 31. Id. 
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of the vote,32 it was uncontroversial for the Governor to treat her failure in 
the Green Primary as a justification to refuse even the minimal engagement 
of a debate. 
Yet we do not all participate equally in the Green Primary.  Participation 
instead is quite selective.  In 2014, 5.4 million Americans contributed 
something to a federal campaign.33  That is less than 2 percent of 
America.34  But among that 2 percent, the significance of those contributors 
was quite varied.  The top 100 contributors gave almost as much as the 
bottom 4.75 million.35  The top 1 percent of donors accounted for about 70 
percent of the Super PAC money spent in the election cycle.36  Less than 
125,000 gave at least the maximum amount permitted in a cycle ($2600).37  
Less than 30,000 gave in aggregate $10,000 or more.38  The significant (and 
hence, relevant) funders of American politics are very few.  Yet when one 
recognizes that candidates for Congress and members of Congress spend 
anywhere between 30 percent and 70 percent of their time courting those 
very few contributors,39 the significance of their influence becomes 
obvious.  We have evolved a system for funding campaigns that makes 
candidates dependent upon a tiny fraction of the 1 percent to secure an 
essential step in the process of election. 
The Green Primary violates equality for the same reason that the White 
Primary did.  This is not a violation of speech equality, but of equality of 
citizens.  An essential step in the process of elections excludes citizens 
unjustifiably.  In the White Primary, that exclusion was based on race.  
Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it was unconstitutional.  
In the Green Primary, that exclusion is based on wealth.  Against the 
background of a fundamental commitment to a representative democracy 
“dependent on the People alone,”40—where “the People” means “[n]ot the 
rich, more than the poor,”41—that exclusion is unjustifiable.  The corruption 
that I described at the start of this Article produces the inequality that we 
 
 32. See New York State Primary Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes. 
com/2014/results/primaries/new-york-state (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
9MNN-NQ2C]. 
 33. OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/VYT3-NHJ3]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Kenneth P. Vogel, Big Money Breaks Out, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:32 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/top-political-donors-113833.html [http://perma.cc/ 
N2FZ-WUBQ]. 
 36. 2014 Super PACs:  How Many Donors Give?, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/YY68-BGH7]. 
 37. Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ 
donordemographics.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ZPB8-PVJS]; 2014 
Campaign Contribution Limits, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ 
limits.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SS5W-G64C]. 
 38. Donor Demographics, supra note 37. 
 39. Lawrence Lessig, Opinion, More Money Can Beat Big Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/opinion/in-campaign-financing-more-money-
can-beat-big-money.html [http://perma.cc/5A93-685K]. 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 9, at 326 (James Madison). 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 9, at 351 (James Madison). 
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must remedy.  The two are not in conflict; rather, the two complement each 
other. 
Critically, my argument is not (necessarily) a constitutional one.  While 
the White Primary violated the Constitution, I am not claiming the Green 
Primary also violates the Constitution.  That was the argument of Jamin 
Raskin and John Bonifaz,42 and it may or may not be correct as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
My claim instead is one part political and one part constitutional.  I 
continue to believe that under the Court’s jurisprudence, the kind of 
“corruption” that I and Teachout have described should justify at least some 
prophylactic campaign finance reforms.  Not all reforms—I do not believe 
the regulation that Citizens United struck down could be justified with even 
this conception of corruption.  But I do believe that this conception shows 
why SpeechNow.org v. FEC43 was wrongly decided, and possibly 
McCutcheon v. FEC44 too. 
But whether the Green Primary violates the Constitution, it certainly 
violates a political commitment of our tradition of equal representation—at 
least in the democratic branch of our representative democracy, which after 
the Seventeenth Amendment, should include the Senate.  That violation 
should at least motivate representatives to adopt reforms that might mitigate 
this inequality.  And it is here, ultimately, that Hasen, Teachout, and I 
firmly agree:  the single most important reform of our political system 
would be to change the way elections are funded.  Hasen and I have pressed 
for vouchers as the way to do that.45  Teachout has argued for public 
funding more generally.46  Either way, this is the real and important fight 
that should unite us.  Whether strategically it makes sense to continue to 
describe our system as “corrupt” is a small point.  That “corruption” is 
inequality is the more important and fundamental agreement. 
There is one further implication of this argument that is useful to note, at 
least for jurists who care about the continued fidelity of our system to 
founding values.  It is perfectly clear that the equalities that are most salient 
today constitutionally were not part of the framing conception.  The nation 
that protected slavery was not committed to racial equality.  A nation that 
denied women the right to vote until the beginning of the twentieth century 
was not committed to sex equality.  And no nation in the eighteenth century 
would have even recognized the question of sexual orientation equality.  
 
 42. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 26. 
 43. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 44. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 45. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:  An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1996); Dylan Matthews, Can Vouchers Fix Campaign Finance?, WASH. POST:  WONKBLOG 
(July 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/22/can-
vouchers-fix-campaign-finance/ [http://perma.cc/E79N-DLFM]. 
 46. See Zephyr Teachout, Opinion, Legalized Bribery:  Zephyr Teachout on Sheldon 
Silver, Corruption and New York Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/01/26/opinion/zephyr-teachout-on-sheldon-silver-corruption-and-new-york-
politics.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/NCW6-CKR7]. 
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These are the equalities that dominate equal protection analysis for us 
today, but these equalities were nowhere present in the political conception 
of equality of our Framers. 
Yet as Madison’s description of the people evinces—“[n]ot the rich, 
more than the poor”47—the fight against the aristocracy was a critical 
dimension of equality that was central to the Framers.  The means of that 
fight are obscure to us—we read the property requirement for voting as a 
preference for wealth; the Framers understood it as a way to avoid the 
ability for the rich to buy the votes of the poor.48  But regardless, the 
Framers clearly expressed an ideal that citizens should be equal with respect 
to wealth, whether or not they were equal with respect to race or sex. 
Yet the Court has fixated on a related, but distinct, idea, which has now 
practically disabled Congress from pursuing this founding ideal of equality.  
As the Court wrote in Buckley v. Valeo,49 “the concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment . . . .”50  But whether the Constitution forbids state action to 
achieve speech equality, it certainly does not forbid (indeed, I believe it 
mandates) state action to achieve citizen or political equality.  And the mere 
fact that regulation might be justified by reference to political equality 
cannot be used to invalidate that regulation simply because it might also be 
used to justify speech equality.  The conflation of the two is a logical error:  
a perfectly equal speech market (imagine every candidate gets exactly the 
same amount of public funding to run her campaign) does not entail 
political equality (imagine that public funding in the context of a white 
primary system), and a system with perfectly equal citizens does not entail 
speech equality (if every voter had a voucher to use to fund political 
campaigns, some campaigns would have more money than others).  The 
Court could be perfectly correct about the First Amendment principle.  But 
it is perfectly fallacious to extend that principle into every sphere of the 
Constitution. 
We should not, as scholars, be fighting about which flaw our Republic 
reveals—inequality or corruption.  We should be united—let us say, not 
citizens or plutocrats, but scholars, united—in the view that our Republic is 
both unequal and corrupt.  And that it is time we find a way to fix it. 
 
 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 9, at 351 (James Madison). 
 48. See generally Brief for Professor Lawrence Lessig, supra note 11. 
 49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 50. Id. at 48. 
